Hastings Law Journal
Volume 29 | Issue 2

Article 5

1-1977

Vicarious Responsibility of an Insured for
Misconduct in Third Party Claims Administration
Stephen J. Kottmeier

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Kottmeier, Vicarious Responsibility of an Insured for Misconduct in Third Party Claims Administration, 29 Hastings L.J. 345
(1977).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol29/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Vicarious Responsibility of an Insured for Misconduct
in Third Party Claims Administration
Introduction
Recent years have seen the rapid development of statutory and
common law protections for persons dealing with insurers.- The persons initially and primarily protected have been the insureds. A third
party often enters the insurance arena, however, in the person of a
tort victim claiming against the insured. The result is a triangular
relationship which should assume increasing importance in the future,
especially to the insured.
One leg of the triangle, the insurer's relationship with its insured,
has already received close judicial scrutiny. Currently, insurers are
being subjected to increased liability for their treatment of injured
claimants. 2 When the insurer is liable to the claimant, a question
arises as to the insured's responsibility to the claimant for the acts of
his or her insurer.
At first blush, this question may seem unusual, because insureds,
particularly those involved in the reported cases, often are individuals
with less influence or authority than their insurers. As the cases discussed below indicate, however, courts often choose to impose responsibility upon insureds for their insurers' conduct, at least if not
to do so would result in hardship to the third party claimant. This
approach can be viewed simply as an application of the legal adage
that if one of two innocent persons must suffer, the one who creates
the situation should bear the burden.
This Note will review situations in which courts have assigned
responsibility to insureds for their insurers' actions in dealing with
third parties. The discussion will then turn to an area not yet explored by the courts, responsibility for "oppressive" conduct of insurers
in handling claims.
1. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103,
113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1975); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d
1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426
P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). See also Note, Johansen v. California State Automobile Association: Has California Adopted Strict Liability for an Insurer's Failure
to Settle?, 27 HA=Gs L.J. 895 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973);
Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
[345 ]
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Oppressive conduct may be viewed generally as overreaching
directed toward third party claimants to achieve advantageous settlements or judgments for an insurer and its insured.3 The nature of
such conduct may be best understood in the context of a hypothetical. 4 Assume that A is severely injured by B and that B has a liability
insurance policy with the XYZ Insurance Company. When A notifies
B that he believes B is liable for his injuries, B contacts his insurer,
XYZ. Although B's liability is reasonably clear, XYZ hopes to avoid
the potentially large liability indicated by the extent of A's injuries.
XYZ therefore begins a course of conduct designed to minimize its
liability. It visits A and acknowledges B's probable liability. It urges
A to refrain from retaining an attorney or filing suit 5 in return for
a promise of a large but reasonable settlement once the nature and
extent of A's injuries are clear. The promise also encompasses medical
expenses and support for A's family in the interim. A, who is worried
and otherwise without financial means, agrees.
Over the next eleven months, A becomes completely dependent
upon XYZ for his family's well-being. XYZ in the meantime further
protects itself by making thorough trial preparations with A's trusting cooperation. Evidence and confidential information are obtained
while fresh, and medical examinations of the trusting claimant are
conducted by XYZ's doctors. At the end of eleven months, A, still
incapacitated, seeks to secure the settlement he has been led to believe
is forthcoming. A's offer is received without comment by XYZ.
The next day, although it has continuously acknowledged liability
and given no intimation of a desire to litigate, XYZ files suit in B's
name against A. A's stress, caused originally by his injuries, is exacerbated by the sudden loss of the anticipated means of support for
his family. XYZ and B, who must pay anything above the policy
limits, benefit because A is under sudden pressure to settle for a low
figure. In the event that they must litigate, their preparedness and
A's complete lack of precaution afford them greater probability of a
low judgment.
In this hypothetical, the insurer has obviously used unfair tactics
to gain an advantage over a weaker adverse party. Such tactics have
3.

Levin & Chapman, Insurance Company's Liability For "Oppressive Conduct"

- Another New Dimension in the Field of Torts, 17
(1974)

[hereinafter cited as Levin & Chapman].

TRIAL

LAwYRS GumE 374, 389

See note 127 & accompanying text

infra.
4. For derivation of hypothetical facts, see First Amended Crosscomplaint, Gerber
v. Goff, No. 132775 (Cal. Super. Ct., Stanislaus Co., filed Nov. 21, 1975).
5. Such advice is now defined as an unfair insurance settlement practice in
California. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(14) (West Supp. 1977). Repeated use of
unfair practices may subject the insurer to discipline by the insurance commissioner.
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.05-.08 (West 1972).
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been held to be actionable when directed toward the insured." The
argument has been made that liability should likewise be imposed upon
the insurer for misconduct directed toward a third party claimant.
The third party claimant's position parallels that of a judicially protected insured: he is often economically vulnerable and unskilled
in negotiation or legal matters, so that he is unable to evaluate the
worth of the claim.7 This Note will expand the argument that liability for such tactics should be imposed on the insurer and urge that
liability also be imposed on the insured. As will be demonstrated,
sound legal principles and social policy support this movement in the
law. Ultimately, all of the parties involved will benefit from the
higher standard of conduct that this Note advocates.
Basis of Liability
Liability insurance policies commonly provide the insurer the
right to control the handling of a third party's claim against the insured, including the right to defend.8 Early cases characterized the
insurer as an independent contractor with respect to the insured, but
the modem rule is that the insurer and insured are agent and principal
respectively when, under the policy, the insurer assumes control of
the defense of a third party claim.1o The central question therefore
becomes when will acts of the insurer be imputed to an insured under
the principles of agent and principal.".
Cases that have applied this theory of agency can be classified
6. See CAL. INS. CODE: § 790.03(h)(5) (West Supp. 1977) (unfair settlement
practice not to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement if liability is reasonably clear); Levin & Chapman, supra note 3 at 388.
7.

See H. Ross, SErED Our

OF

CouNT 116-18, 142-43 (1970).

8. See, e.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 7, 231 N.W. 257,
258-59 (1930), modified, 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931); 44 Am. Jun. 2d Insurance § 1524, at 398 (1969) (insurance policies normally have provision vesting
right in insurer to "make investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any claim or
suit as it deems expedient").
9. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass, Inc., 240
F. 573, 580-81 (1st Cir. 1917); Holmes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. 290, 293, 14 P.2d
149, 150 (1932).
10. 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AmD PnACnCE § 4681 (1962 & Supp.
1977) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN]; 3 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsURANcE LAw
§ 25:99 (2d ed. 1960 & Supp. 1976). Appleman suggests, however, that the relationship is more complex than merely agent and principal. APPLEmAN, supra at 424
n.5. This statement probably refers to "bad faith" settlement cases in which courts
hold that the insurer will be subjected to "closer scrutiny" than an ordinary agent.
See note 18 & accompanying text infra.
11. The interfacing of general agency principles and the insurance cases discussed
in the following sections of this Note will be considered in a concluding section. See
text accompanying notes 102-24 infra.
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in five groups: (1) cases dealing with insurers' refusal to settle;
(2) cases in which insureds seek to set aside default judgments caused
by the negligence of insurers; (3) cases in which deceit or fraud of
insurers is imputed to insureds to bar assertions of statutes of limitations or notice of injury statutes; (4) cases involving claimants' actions
against insureds on settlement contracts negotiated by insurers; and
(5) cases in which satisfactions of judgments or dismissals with
prejudice obtained by insurers were binding on insureds.
This Note will deal with each of these categories. Finally, it
will return to the intriguing question of how far the agent-principal
theory can be extended.
Insurer's Failure to Settle
The first group of cases under which the insurer is considered the
agent of the insured deals with the bad faith or negligent refusal of
an insurer to settle a claim against its insured. Although these cases
do not directly involve third party claimants, a brief review of the
opinions will facilitate an understanding of those cases which do
involve third party claimants.
California courts recently have relied upon implied covenants in
insurance contracts to impose duties upon insurers in handling claims
against their insureds. 12 Courts in many other jurisdictions have
found similar duties in the typical insurance policy term, empowering
the insurer to control the investigation, litigation, and settlement of
a third party's claim. 13 When the insurer has acted under this term,
the courts have held that it has become the agent of the insured.14
Because their interests are potentially adverse, an insurer has been
held to owe a greater than normal fiduciary obligation to its insured
principal. 15 The insurer's duty is to act in utmost good faith toward
the insured's interests in handling settlements. 16
12. See note 1 supra.
13. In cases involving negligent or bad faith failure to settle, California courts
apparently have never discussed in an opinion the rationale discussed in the text accompanying notes 14-27 infra.
14. See, e.g., American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G.A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830,
832 (10th Cir. 1949); Shapiro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 44 F.R.D. 429, 431 (E.D. Pa.
1968); McCombs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 231 Mo. App. 1206, 1223, 89 S.W.2d 114,
122 (1935); Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 469, 134 A.2d 223, 228
(1957); Van Dyke v. White, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 611, 349 P.2d 430, 436 (1960).
15. Adverse interests of an insured and the insurer arise if an insurer can settle
at or near the policy limits. In such a case, it loses little by litigating while the in-

sured risks exposure to liability above the policy limits. See Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
16. See note 14 supra.
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As was expressed by the Tenth Circuit in Traders & General InCo.,1 7 the courts will subject the
insured's exercise of its duty to closer scrutiny:

surance Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas

When the insurer undertakes the defense of the claim or suit,
it acts as the agent of its assured by virtue of the contract of insurance between the parties, and when a conflict of interest arises
between the insurer, as agent, and assured, as principal, the insurer's conduct will be subject to closer scrutiny than that of the
ordinary agent, because of his adverse interest.18
The Wisconsin Supreme Court extensively discussed the insurerinsured agency relationship in this context in the leading case of Hilker
v. Western Automobile Insurance Co. 19 In that case an insured sued
his insurer, contending that the insurer had acted in bad faith in
handling the defense of a third party claim. The insurer's conduct
allegedly resulted in a judgment against the insured in excess of the
policy limits.
The court looked to the insurance contract which gave the insurer
"full and complete control of the handling and adjustment of all claims
for liability made against the insured, and provided that the insured
"shall not interfere in any negotiations for settlement or any legal
procedure.' "20
The court held that "[u]nder such a contract there is no escape
from the conclusion that the insurance company became the agent of
the insured for the purpose of handling such claims and of conducting
such litigation." 2 ' This conclusion was not foreclosed by the fact that
the agent-insurer's interest in litigating rather than settling at or near
the policy limits was adverse to that of its principal, who was interested
in avoiding liability above the policy limits. Because the agent-insurer had full knowledge of this conflict when the parties contracted,
the insurer was subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny by the court
22
than would be applied to the usual agent.
The courts' adoption of the agency approach probably derives
17. 129 F.2d 621 (lth Cir. 1942).
18. Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
19. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930). The Wisconsin court later modified its
opinion in 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413, and indicated that the discussion of agency
may not have been crucial to its decision. The original Hilker opinion, however, has
often been cited by other courts. See, e.g., Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 369,
52 N.E.2d 968, 969 (1944); Selby v. Victoria Mines, Inc., 124 Mont. 321, 328, 221

P.2d 423, 426 (1950).
20.
21.
22.
Co., 81

204 Wis. at 3, 231 N.W. at 258.
Id. at 5, 231 N.W. at 259.
Id. at 6, 231 N.W. at 260 (citing Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924)).
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from a conflict that existed in the "failure to settle" insurance cases.
In the past, courts disagreed about an insurer's liability for a merely
negligent failure to settle a claim. 23 Although courts have often imposed liability on an insurer for its bad faith failure to settle, until
recently they have refused to find an insurer liable for mere negligent
representation of its insured. The courts apparently believed that
24
the exercise of care was beyond the scope of the insurance contract.
The insured, therefore, could recover for the excess liability to which
he had been exposed only upon proof that the insurer had intentionally
disregarded the insured's interests in failing to settle the claim. 25 By
applying an agency theory, however, courts could demand that the
insurer conform to a higher standard and exercise the "degree of care
and diligence which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in
the management of his own business .... .. 20 The insurer would
therefore be liable if it failed to exercise the care and skill in handling
a claim that an insured should reasonably expect from a professional
"defender of lawsuits.."27
Default Against Insured As a Result of Negligence of the Insurer
Third party claimants are directly involved in the second area
in which agency principles have been applied, the entry of default
judgments against insureds. This involvement arises because pursuant
to the insurance policy, an insured who has been served with a summons by a claimant will forward the papers to the insurer. The insurer will then assume responsibility for the conduct of the litigation.
If the insurer is negligent in handling the summons and the insured
thereby fails to answer the third party's complaint within the statutory
period, a default may be entered against the insured.2 8 The insured's
failure to answer may result from the insurer's misplacing the sum23. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 180-81 (1955). Negligence in this context
means not exercising care in determining whether to settle a claim. Id. at 180. See
also APPLEMAN, supra note 10, §§ 4712-13.
24. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 180 (1955). See also Douglas v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 376, 127 A. 708, 711 (1924).
25. APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 4712, at 565-66.
26. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958).
27. APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 4712, at 562. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co.
v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929). California
courts may now have imposed a standard of strict liability upon insurers for failure to
settle. See generally Note, Johansen v. California State Automobile Association: Has
California Adopted Strict Liability for an Insurer's Failure to Settle?, 27 HAsTINGs L.J.

895 (1976).
28.

See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 870 (1963).
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mons, 29 failing to forward it to counsel,30 mistaking the time to an32
swer,3 1 failing properly to arrange an extension of time to answer,
or being neglectful in some other manner.a3 A motion to set aside the

default will usually be made upon the ground that the insured is not
responsible for the neglect of the insurer or, in the alternative, that
the insurer's neglect is excusable.

Courts are split in their response to these motions, but the holdings
generally fall into three patterns.

First, some courts hold that the

insurer's neglect cannot be imputed to the insured.3 4 Second, the
incident of neglect is found inexcusable and the negligence of the
insurer is imputed to the insured by expressly or implicitly defining
the insured as the principal of the insurer.3 5 Third, the courts may

attribute the negligence to the insured but find it excusable.36
Certain caveats must be considered with respect to such a classification scheme. Even if the insured is 'not responsible for the neglect
of the insurer, the insured himself may be the one primarily negligent.
Denial of the motion to set aside default would therefore be proper.s

Because in the matter of default judgments, statutes vary greatly and
courts are vested with great discretion, decisions to set aside default
29. See, e.g., Colletti v. Schrieffer's Motor Serv., Inc., 38 Ill. App. 2d 128, 186
N.E.2d 659 (1962); Ward v. Cook United,. Inc., 521 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975); Stevens v. Gulf Oil Corp., 108 R.I. 209, 274 A.2d 163 (1971); Parsons v.
McCoy, 202 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1973).
30. See, e.g., Milks v. Clark's Greensboro, Inc., 260 N.C. 676, 133 S.E.2d 517
(1963); Richmond v. American Federation of Labor Medical Serv. Plan, 415 Pa. 561,
204 A.2d 271 (1964).
31. E.g., Johnson v. McIntyre, 80 Idaho 135, 326 P.2d 989 (1958).
32. E.g., Burke v. Rachau, 262 Or. 323, 497 P.2d 1154 (1972).
33. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 870 (1963), which in part classifies cases according
to the nature of the insurer's neglect.
34. See, e.g., Stehman v. Reiehhold Chemicals, Inc., 57 IM. App. 2d 40, 206
N.E.2d 299 (1965); Flexsteel Indus., Inc. v. Morbern Indus., Ltd., __ Iowa ,
239 N.W.2d 593 (1976); Hobbs v. Martin Marietta Co., 257 Iowa 124, 131 N.W.2d
772 (1964); Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 53 N.W.2d
454 (1952). These cases are concerned with giving the insured a "day in court."
Id. at 32, 53 N.W.2d at 456.
35. E.g., Milks v. Clark's Greensboro, Inc., 260 N.C. 676, 677, 133 S.E.2d 517,
518 (1963); Stevens v. Gulf Oil Corp., 108 R.I. 209, 212, 274 A.2d 163, 164 (1971).
See also Bituminous Cas. Co. v, J.B. Forrest & Sons, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 714, 718-19,
209 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1974).
36. E.g., Parsons v. McCoy, 202 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1973). Cf.
Brown v. Hale, 259 N.C. 480, 130 S.E.2d 868 (1963) (reliance upon an attorney by
both insurer and insured held to be excusable neglect).
37. See, e.g., St. Arnold v. Star Expansion Indus., 268 Or. 640, 655-56, 521 P.2d
526, 533 (1974). See also Hobbs v. Martin Marietta Co., 257 Iowa 124, 130-31, 131
N.W.2d 772, 776 (1964).
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judgments have varied dramatically. 38 Decisions, therefore, may fit
one pattern for a variety of reasons.
In the first pattern of cases, the insurer's neglect has been held
not to be imputable to the insured. This result is probably explained
by the discretion vested in the courts in the default area. The courts
no doubt delieved that justice and fairness are better served by giving
the insured a day in court, than by permitting the insurer's acts to
preclude the defense. 3 9 A broader view of the interests involved suggests, however, that the better reasoned cases find that justice is better
40
served by imputing to the insured the negligence of the insurer.
In the second group of cases, as in the first, the third party claimant
contends that the inexcusable neglect of an insurer bars setting aside
the default of its insured. This contention was accepted by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in Stevens v. Gulf Oil Corp.,41 affirming the
denial of a motion to set aside a-default judgment. The insured, Gulf
Oil, had promptly forwarded a summons served upon it to its insurer,
Travelers Insurance Company. After Travelers misplaced the papers,
a default was entered against Gulf. Gulf moved to set aside the default, but the court held that Travelers' neglect was inexcusable and
should be imputed to Gulf. Judge Kelleher explained:
While Gulf argues that its insurer is not its agent, we disagree.
It is clear that Gulf forwarded the summons and complaint to
Travelers in pursuance of its insurance policy which gives the
insurer control of the handling and adjustment of claims against
the insured. In such circumstances, we shall adopt the principle
that the insurer, by retaining control of suits brought against the
insured, becomes the agent of the insured."
Although the Rhode Island court does not further explain its
holding, a proper inference is that if an insured enters a contract with
his insurer, "the prime purpose of which is to handle the litigation" as
against third parties, he cannot be heard to complain of his representative's misconduct. 43 This rationale also underlines holdings that do
not explicitly define the insurer as the insured's agent but nevertheless
impute the insurer's negligence to the insured. 4 4 The effect of these
cases is that the insurer's negligent mishandling of a third party's claim
38. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 870, 875 (1963); St. Arnold v. Star Expansion Indus.,
268 Or. 640, 653, 521 P.2d 526, 533 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Stehman v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 57 Ill. App. 2d 40, 49, 206
N.E.2d 299, 303 (1965).
40. See text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
41. 108 R.I. 209, 274 A.2d 163 (1971).
42. Id. at 212, 274 A.2d at 164.
43. Ward v. Cook United, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 461, 473 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
44. See, e.g., Burke v. Rachau, 262 Or. 323, 334, 497 P.2d 1154, 1160 (1972).
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against the insured will be binding upon the45insured despite the latter's
innocence with respect to that misconduct.
This result is justifiable. The third party claimant properly
availed herself of the judicial system. She had no choice in the
selection of the insurer as the insured's representative and no part in
the misconduct that caused the default. The misconduct affects the
plaintiff-claimant in the same manner whether committed by the defendant or by the defendant's agent. If the misconduct that caused
the default would be considered inexcusable when committed by the
insured defendant, there is no good reason to excuse the insured merely
because he interposed between himself and the claimant a third party
who committed an identical act. The insured does not claim that the
misconduct causing the default would excuse the default of any other
defendant. 46 His only basis 4for
seeking to set aside the judgment is
7
his reliance upon the insurer.

The opposite result, moreover, is likely to encourage improper
handling of claims. If an insurer believes that its actions will not
affect the insured's defense, it may cavalierly ignore time limitations,
secure in the knowledge that the insured will not be barred from proceeding with his own defense in the event the insurer is barred. This
invitation to abuse is inimical to the public policy embodied in statutes
permitting entry of default for failure to answer within a limited time.
These statutes encourage speedy resolution of disputes. The mere
interposition of the insurer is an insufficient reason to overrule the
plaintiff's interest in speedy resolution of his claim.
Because of the way the default was caused, the insured's claim
should be asserted against the party responsible, the insurer. Between
the plaintiff-third party and the defendant-insured, responsibility for
the inexcusable failure properly to handle a claim should be assigned
to the party responsible for delegating the control of the litigation, the
insured.
In certain instances, those that fall within the third pattern, it
is to the advantage of the insured for the court to recognize the insurer
as his agent. If the insured believes the acts of the insurer constitute
excusable neglect, he or she will make a motion to set aside default,
urging that those acts be imputed to him or her.48 A default judgment
45. The insured may recover, however, from his insurer for its misconduct. See
Pacific Indem. Group v. Dunton, 243 Cal. App. 2d 504, 508-09, 52 Cal. Rptr. 332,
335 (1966).
46. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 870, 873 (1963).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 870, 873 (1963); Tasea Inv. Corp. v. Dale, 222
Md. 474, 160 A.2d 920 (1960).
See also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 473 (West Supp.
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cannot be set aside unless the defendant is able to meet the statutory
requirement that he or she committed excusable neglect. 49 The relevance of the statutory requirement was illustrated in the California
case of Greenwell v. Caro.50 The insured and his representatives
failed to file a timely answer, and a default was entered. The defendant's insurer had obtained an oral stipulation to extend time but had
failed properly to address an envelope containing a written stipulation.
The stipulation thus was never filed, and the insured defaulted. The
California Court of Appeal found this neglect to be excusable and
attributed it to the insured on a theory of agency.51 The default
therefore was properly set aside. Similar results have been reached
52
by the supreme courts of Idaho and West Virginia.
Again, this holding is justified. If legislatures and courts have
decided that the conduct leading to entry of default justifies reopening
a claim, no reason exists to alter the norm merely because an insurer
is involved.
Insurer's Deceit or Fraud
In addition to imputing an insurer's neglect in handling claims
to its insured, under certain circumstances courts have also imputed
to the insured intentional or reckless misconduct committed by the
insurer in handling a third party's claim. These circumstances usually
arise in cases in which the insured seeks to avail himself of a statutory
bar against the third party's claim. The bar may be either the statute
of limitations" 3 or a statute that requires a claimant to give notice to
the tortfeasor of his injury.5 4 The claimant's response to the assertion
of either of these defenses has sometimes been that he was deceived
by the insurer who made "promises to pay, settle, or perform which,
in whole or in part had the effect of inducing [the claimant] to delay
taking appropriate legal action" until after the time limit has expired. 55
1977) at issue in Greenwell v. Caro, 114 Cal. App. 2d 35, 249 P.2d 573 (1952) discussed in text accompanying notes 50-51 infra.
49. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 473 (West Supp. 1977).
50. 114 Cal. App. 2d 35, 249 P.2d 573 (1952).
51. Id. at 37, 249 P.2d at 574.
52. Johnson v. McIntyre, 80 Idaho 135, 139, 326 P.2d 989, 992 (1958); Parsons
v. McCoy, 202 S.E.2d 632, 636 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1973).
53. See, e.g., Regus v. Schartkoff, 156 Cal. App. 2d 382, 319 P.2d 721 (1957);
Marcum v. Richmond Auto Parts Co., 149 Ind. App. 120, 270 N.E.2d 884 (1971);
Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 52 N.E.2d 968 (1944); Hover v. Claverack Grange
No. 934, 46 Misc. 2d 113, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1965); McLaughlin v. Blake,
120 Vt. 174, 136 A.2d 492 (1957); Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 482, § 13 (1970).
54. See, e.g., Heck v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58 (1958);
Rooney v. Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Social & Athletic Club, Inc., 330 Mass. 340, 113
N.E.2d 838 (1953); Will v. Jessen, 273 Wis. 495, 78 N.W.2d 905 (1956).
55. Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 482, 529 (1970).
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The claimant thus seeks to estop the insured from asserting these defenses by arguing that the insurer's conduct is imputable to the insured.
In Hayes v. Gessner,50 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts accepted such an argument and held that the defendant-insured
was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations against a claimant. The facts recited by the court reveal that the claimant was
strongly urged by the insurer's investigator not to obtain counsel and
to put the matter over until the next fall. The claimant contacted
the insurer the following October concerning a settlement offer, which
he had been told would "always" be open. The insurer then instructed him that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations
and that the insurer would no longer consider it.
The question before the Hayes court was whether the insurer's
actions would bind the insured so that he could not assert the statute
of limitations. The court held the insured bound, using the following
reasoning:
By the terms of the policy the defendant had conferred "the sole
right of settlement and defense" upon his insurance company. By
so doing he not only authorized the company to conclude a settlement by which he would be bound but he also necessarily authorized the company to conduct the negotiations required to make
such a settlement. Just as the defendant would have been bound
by the effect of these negotiations if they had resulted in a settlement, so also is he bound when they result in an estoppel. He
cannot turn over to an insurer the whole management of the
subject of settlements in his behalf and accept the benefit of the
insurer's effort when they are successful and relieve him from
liability but repudiate
their consequences when they affect his
defense adversely. 57
The key to the holding is that the insured transferred to the insurer
the "sole right" to defend and thereby established the insurer as his
agent, 58 whether or not the result was favorable.
The court's reasoning is consistent with general principles of
agency. One authority has stated the general rule for a principal's
liability for an agent's misrepresentation: The principal is liable if
56. 315 Mass. 366, 52 N.E.2d 968 (1944).
57. Id. at 369, 52 N.E.2d at 969.
58. Cf. Rooney v. Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Social & Athletic Club, Inc., 330 Mass.
340, 113 N.E.2d 838 (1953) (policy did not create an "exclusive right" to defend in
insurer, and notice to it held not to be notice to insured). The Rooney result seems
harsh because the claimant was called upon by the insurance investigator who solicited
a statement. The insured obviously turned the claim over to the insurer. See also
McChristian v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 748, 750 (W.D. Ark.

1969) (similar policy provision held to exclude the insured from settlement negotiations and turn "absolute control" over to the insurer); note 69 & accompanying text
infra: RESTATEmENT (SEcoND)

OF AGENCY §§ 268, 272 (1957).
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the fraud is committed by the agent in the transaction of the business
of the agency. If the principal has conferred actual or apparent authority upon the agent to make representations of fact to third parties
concerning the subject matter of the agency, the principal will be
liable for fraudulent misrepresentations committed in negotiating such
a transaction. But the rule is even broader. The Restatement asserts
that even if the principal has done no act to confer actual or apparent
authority upon the agent to make representations of fact, he will be
liable for fraudulent misrepresentations of the agent if it is usual for
persons in that trade to make representations. Thus it is argued that
even the undisclosed principal will be held liable for the fraud of his
agent who has been told to make no representations if it is reasonable
in that trade for the third person to rely on the representation. The
argument is strongest when the agent has received money or other
assets from the third party in reliance upon the fraud and has paid
over or transmitted these assets to the undisclosed principal.59 An
insured is not an "undisclosed principal." He in effect, however, receives the injured claimant's "asset," if by the insurer's acts he has
been released from liability on the claimant's cause of action. He
therefore should be responsible for his insurer's fraud.
The argument that the insured has insufficient control over his
insurer for the latter to be an agent was rejected by the Massachusetts
court. The court stated that "[ilt is no answer to say that the company acts in its own behalf, and that the defendant cannot control its
conduct. It does act in its own behalf, but it also acts in behalf of
the defendant to the extent of his interest in the defense .... "60
The insured's interest is his liability for the part of a judgment beyond
the policy limits. He can avoid this liability if, as a result of the
insurer's misconduct, he is able to argue that the claim is barred by
the statute of limitations. If the insured is able to disclaim any responsibility for the insurer's conduct but reap the benefits of that
misconduct, insureds may be encouraged to select insurers who engage
in deceitful misconduct. Such a result is unjust and undesirable.
The California Court of Appeal has taken a position similar to
that of the Massachusetts court. It held that allegations by an insurer that would constitute actionable deceit would serve to estop its
insured from asserting the statute of limitations.6 1 The same result
Conant, Liability of Principals for Torts of Agents: A Comparative View,
L. REV. 42, 55 (1968) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Conant].
60. 315 Mass. at 369, 52 N.E.2d at 969.
61. Regus v. Schartkoff, 156 Cal. App. 2d 382, 387, 319 P.2d 721, 725 (1957).
This part of the decision may be dictum. The court held that the claimant's complaint
stated several causes of action in fraud and contract against the insurer. It is not
clear in the opinion whether the insured was named as codefendant in these counts.
59.

47

NEB.
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has been reached in New York, 62 Indiana, 63 and Vermont 64 in cases
in which insurers have acted to "lull" claimants into delaying their
claims and insureds thereafter have sought to raise the statute of
limitations as a defense against those claims.
Although statutes limiting the time within which an action may
be brought are common, some states in addition have statutes requiring
that notice of injury be given to the allegedly liable party within a
specified time. Failure to comply results in a loss of the injured party's
cause of action. Such a statute was at issue before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Will v. lessen.65 The Wisconsin statute6 6 required
service of notice of injury upon the defendant-insured within two years
of the date of injury. Even though the claimant failed to give timely
notice to the insured, summary judgment was denied to the insurer
and insured. The plaintiff-third party claimant alleged that during
settlement negotiations the insurer had assured him that legal counsel
would be unnecessary. He asserted also that he was able to serve
timely notice only upon the insurer because the insurer had not informed him 6f the notice of injury statute until twenty-four hours
67
before its expiration.
The court found that triable issues of fact were stated and affirmed
the denial of summary judgment. Although notice to the insurer was
deemed insubstantial compliance with the statute,68 the court found
that the injured claimant might be able to prove that the insurer acted
as the insured's agent, thereby binding the insured and estopping him
from asserting the notice requirement. The necessary element to
prove would be either that "the insurance policy gives the insurance
company control of the handling and adjustment of claims against
the insured" or that the insured turned "over the settlement of the
claim to the insurer in the absence of such a provision .
"9...
6 As
in Hayes, this holding is proper because the insured should not be
If he was, then the result of the case is that the court did not impute these actions
at law to the insured. The latter was held to have been properly dismissed from
the action.
62. Hover v. Claverack Grange No. 934, 46 Misc. 2d 113, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1015
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
63. Marcum v. Richmond Auto Parts Co., 149 Ind. App. 120, 270 N.E.2d 884
(1971).
64. McLaughlin v. Blake, 120 Vt. 174, 136 A.2d 492 (1957).
65. 273 Wis. 495, 78 N.W.2d 905 (1956).
66. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 330.19(5) (West 1955).
67. For current California law covering this situation, see note 5 & accompanying
text supra.
68. This view seems inconsistent with the court's finding of an agency. See
RE TATENT (SncoN)
oF AGENcy §§ 9(3), 268 (1957). See also Heck v. City
of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 609, 88 N.W.2d 58, 63 (1958) (dictum).
69. 273 Wis. at 499-500, 78 N.W.2d at 908.
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able to avoid liability merely by selecting an insurer, turning the claim
over to it, and disclaiming responsibility for the insurer's acts, although
reaping any benefits from misconduct.
The effect of these cases is that intentional misconduct on the
part of an insurer in handling a third party's claim against its insured
may be binding on the insured in an action between the claimant and
insured if the insured has authorized the insurer, in the policy or by
other means, to be his representative.
Contracts Negotiated by Insurers
Multiple Liability of the Insured as a Result of Insurer's Negligence
in Drafting
Although the proceedings considered in the above section were
of an equitable nature'T the principle embodied in the holdings can
be extended to situations directly resulting in the monetary liability
of an insured. Pacific Indemnity Group v. Dunton71 provides an
example of such a situation.
The facts in Dunton are unusual in that the third party claimant's
own insurer, rather than the claimant, argued that the insured tortfeasor was liable. The claimant's insurer, Pacific Indemnity Group,
had a right of partial subrogation to the claim of its insured. Pacific
refrained from intervening, however, because State Farm promised
to name Pacific in a settlement agreement between the two insureds.
State Farm negligently failed to draft the settlement agreement to
include Pacific. The settlement was accepted, judgment was entered
by the court, and the insured paid the full amount to the claimants
without a deduction of the subrogation amount. Because Pacific's
subrogation rights remained unsatisfied, it sued State Farm's insured
upon those rights. In the usual case Pacific's subrogation rights against
the insured would have been lost owing to Pacific's failure to intervene.
Pacific argued that it had justifiably relied upon State Farm's promise
to include Pacific in the settlement and that State Farm's conduct
should be imputed to the insured tortfeasor. Pacific asked that the
insured tortfeasor be estopped from raising the defense of Pacific's
failure to intervene because his insurer's conduct had caused that
failure.
A summary judgment in favor of State Farm's insured tortfeasor
was reversed by the California Court of Appeal. The court held that
State Farm's insured tortfeasor would be bound by the representations
70. The default judgment cases are not entirely equitable in result, however, as
undoubtedly in many cases the insured would have prevailed or obtained a lower
judgment through full litigation.
71. 243 Cal. App. 2d 504, 52 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1966).
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and negligent failure of his insurer to include Pacific in the agreement.
The court explained that "State Farm was allegedly the agent of [its
insured]. That is usually the case under a public liability and property

damage insurance indemnity contract. Under the facts as they now
appear, the insurer-agent was negligent.

It subjected its insured to

72
potential double liability for property damage."

Thus, in a case between an innocent party and the insured, the
court assigned a monetary loss that was caused by the insurer's misconduct to the insured. The result is justified because to hold otherwise would permit the insured to avoid a due and owing claim against
him solely because of the insurer's actions. The insured, however,
need not suffer double liability because he has an action in negligence
against his insurer, which may be asserted by crossclaim in the same
73

suit.

Insured's Liability on a Contract Negotiated By The Insurer
Settlement agreements not infrequently are negotiated by insurers
pursuant to insurance policy provisions for insurers to represent their
insureds in settlement negotiations. Courts have held in many contexts that the insurer's actions in handling a settlement bind the insured
in contract.7 4 In so holding, courts have again deemed the insurer
the agent of the insured.
This judicial stance is illustrated in the Montana case of Selby
v. Victoria Mines, Inc.7 5 Selby was involved in an automobile accident with a truck owned by defendant Victoria Mines. Selby contacted the defendant, who referred him to its insurer's adjustor, who
72. Id. at 508-09, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 335. Dunton appears to conflict with another
much older California court of appeal case, Holmes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. 290,
14 P.2d 149 (1932). Holmes was essentially a contract action against the insured on
the ground that it was the surety on a supersedeas bond posted by his insolvent insurer, in which the court held the insurer to be an independent contractor and not an
agent of the insured. Id. at 293, 14 P.2d at 150. See also Bell v. Greenwood, 229
App. Div. 550, 242 N.Y.S. 149 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
73. The Dunton court held that under normal respondeat superior rules, the insured had a right of recoupment against State Farm. In so holding, however, the
court may have mislabeled the theory of liability. Respondeat superior normally applies to the master-servant relationship, although principal-agent liability is a separate
concept. De Ronde v. Gaytime Shops, Inc., 239 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1957). See
also text accompanying notes 129-56 infra.

74.

See generally

RESTATEMmT (SECOND)

OF AGENCY

§ 140 (1957).

The in-

surer, however, has no authority to bind the insured to settle beyond the policy limits.
Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 109, 114 n.7, 493 P.2d 625,
628 (1972) (citing Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69
(1957)). But see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 144 (1957).
75. 124 Mont. 321, 221 P.2d 423 (1950).
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thereafter negotiated with Selby. The two allegedly agreed that
Selby's claim would be settled for $1,580 and that Selby would not
sue the insured, Victoria Mines.
After Selby was unable to secure payment of the settlement
amount from either the insured or insurer, he brought suit against the
insured Victoria Mines on the settlement contract, alleging that the
adjustor represented and bound both the insurer and the insured when
the settlement agreement was reached. The Montana Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's aiguments that the adjustor represented only
the insurer and that the contract was binding only upon the insurer
and not upon it. The court noted that the insured in communicating
with the claimant had characterized the adjustor as the representative
of its insurer. 76 The court found that the insurer was the agent of the
insured 77 and held that the insured was therefore bound by the terms
78
of the settlement contract.
The court's finding of an agency was predicated upon the terms
of the insurance policy, 79 which expressly conferred upon the insurer
"the right to make such negotiation and settlement of any claim or
suit as it should deem expedient. Having so authorized its making,
defendant is bound by whatever settlement the insurance company or
its agent or adjustor made or negotiated within the limits of the
policy ...
."10 The court was not concerned that the insured never
had his day in court on the issue of tort liability to the third party
claimant. Instead the court found that justice had been served because "a wrong which the jury found to have been inflicted upon him
by the [insured]" 8 1 had been redressed.
In a different factual context, a Massachusetts court implicitly
affirmed the insurer's authority to bind its insured. In Service Mutual
Liability Insurance Co. v. Aronofsky12 the insurer settled a claim
against its insured. The insurer then sued the insured for reimbursement, alleging that the claim came within the policy exclusions. The
insured defended, disavowing the settlement agreement on the grounds
76. Id. at 326, 221 P.2d at 425.
77. Id. at 327, 221 P.2d at 425-26. The court relied upon the statutory definition of agency, "[a]n agent is one who represents another, called the principal, in
dealings with third persons," (citing MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 2-101 (1947)). See
also CAL. CIv. CODE § 2295 (West 1954).
78. 124 Mont. at 324, 221 P.2d at 424.
79. Id. at 324, 221 P.2d at 424. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 159 (1957).
80. Id. at 324, 221 P.2d at 425.
81. Id. at 330-31, 221 P.2d at 427.
82. 308 Mass. 249, 31 N.E.2d 837 (1941).
Cf. Insurance Co. of N. America
v. L.C. Young Painting & Decorating Co., 11 Mich. App. 304, 161 N.W.2d 24 (1968)
(insurer's authority under the policy gave it the power to bind the insured to pay
39 settlements of $100 or less under the policy's deductible clause).
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that he had not known of the settlement negotiations. The court
found that the policy expressly gave the insurer the right to settle in
any manner "it deemed expedient."8 3 The court found this authorization to be sufficient to bind the insured whether or not he knew of
the settlement negotiations.
Although the court did not discuss the nature of the insurerinsured relationship, the legal effect is that of an agency. The result
is proper because the insured enjoyed the benefit of the settlement satisfaction of and release from the third party's claim. He should not
have been able to avoid the terms of the insurance policy that required
him to reimburse the insurer, merely by asserting that the settlement
by which he benefited did not bind him.
Settlements Binding on Insured's Own Claim
The issue of the conclusiveness of insurers' actions upon their
insureds with respect to third party claimants has arisen in a final
area. If an insurer has settled a claim against its insured, what is the
effect of that settlement when the insured subsequently seeks to sue
the claimant with whom the settlement was negotiated? The insurer
normally has a broad contractual right to investigate, control and
settle a claim against the insured in any manner "it deems expedient,"
even if it is to his prejudice.8 4 The cases on this issue support the
theory that the insurer operates as the agent of the insured.8 5
The cases may be characterized in two groups. The first group
consists of cases in which the third party brought an action against the
insured that was eventually resolved by a consent judgment as part
of a settlement negotiated by the insurer. The question in these cases
is whether the judgment is res judicata as to all issues that could
have been litigated in the dismissed action, including a counterclaim
of the insured which had not been asserted before the settlement and
judgment.
83. 308 Mass. at 252, 31 N.E.2d at 839. The court qualifies its holding by
stating that fraud or negligence of the insurer could subject the settlement agreement
to attack, but such attack would no doubt only be permissible in an action between
insured and insurer, assuming that the third party did not collude with the insurer.
See notes 12-27 & accompanying text supra (refusal to settle cases). See also Insurance Co. of N. America v. L.C. Young Painting & Decorating Co., 11 Mich. App. 304,
310, 161 N.W.2d 24, 27 (1968).
84. 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1524, at 399 (1969). This right may be qualified, however. There is authority to the effect that a settlement negotiated without
the insured's consent or knowledge or made against his protestations of nonliability
will not bar the insured's own claims against the third party claimant.
85. Equitable considerations could be expected to be involved in this exception
to the general rule. Indeed, review of the cases in this area reveals that the particular result reached by a court depends greatly upon the posture of the parties.
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In Keller v. Keklikian86 the insurer and claimant negotiated a
settlement to the claimant's suit against the insured and stipulated
that the action would be dismissed with prejudice. The insured thereafter filed his own action against the claimant that arose out of the
same occurrence. The court recognized that the insured had had the
right to file his compulsory counterclaim. The insured, however, had
not elected that course, and his insurer had acted on his behalf in filing
a stipulated dismissal. The court found that by turning the claim
over to the insurer pursuant to the contract, the insured had authorized
the insurer to act as his agent and was bound by his insurer's entry
into the stipulated dismissal on his behalf, and the insured's cause of
action was thus barred.17
In Rothtrock v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Co.,88 an insured whose
cause of action against a claimant had been held barred, as in Keller,
pursued her remedies one step further. She filed an action against
her insurer for damages. Because the insurer's neglectful actions had
bound its insured, resulting in loss of her claim, the California court
of appeal held that the insured was entitled to recover the losses she
sustained because of dismissal. The court reversed the summary
judgment and found that a triable issue of fact was presented as to
the amount of loss sustained by the insured owing to the conclusive
89
effect of the insurer's acts.
In Keller, Rothtrock, and similar cases, the insureds sought to act
after entry of final judgments in earlier actions in which they could
have brought their now barred claims. The second group of cases
involve instances in which no prior judgments had been rendered. 90
86. 362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1951).
87. Accord, Long v. Union Indem. Co., 2.77 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931).
Cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brooks, 218 Ga. 593, 129 S.E.2d 798 (1963) (followed
in Ericson v. Hill, 109 Ga. App. 759, 137 S.E.2d 374 (1964); National Dairy Products
Corp. v. Southeastern Adjustors, Inc., 109 Ga. App. 838, 137 S.E.2d 554 (1964); all
since overruled by statute); Ross v. Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N.E.2d 18 (1950)
(insurer's satisfaction of judgment held binding on insured to render judgment final,
including that against insured on crossclaim which he sought to keep alive). See
also Jefferson Mills, Inc. v. Cregson, 124 Ga. App. 96, 183 S.E.2d 529 (1971).
88. 233 Cal. App. 2d 616, 621, 43 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719 (1965).
89. Id. at 624, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 720. See also Nellis, Avoiding Collateral Estoppel
in California Multiple Party Tort Litigation, 9 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 115 (1972-73)
(discussing Rothtrock). Cf. Kennedy v. Jones, 44 F.R.D. 52 (E.D. Va. 1968) (insured barred from bringing claim after insurer prevailed on his behalf in fully litigated
prior action). See also Brightwell v. Rabeck, 430 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1968) (rule of civil procedure interpreted not to require bringing of a counterclaim
in a "friendly suit," i.e., if insurer and claimant merely seek approval of compromise
and arrive at stipulated judgment).
90. See Landers v. Smith, 379 S.W.2d 884, 887-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (distinguishing Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 191, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1951).
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Instead, the insurer had merely negotiated and settled a claim, obtaining a release from the claimant. Thereafter, the insured brought an
action against the claimant. The claimant asserted as a defense that
the release should bar the insured's claim. 91 Courts have usually rejected such an assertion unless92the insured's consent or ratification of
the settlement can be shown.
An agent may bind its principal only to the extent to which it is
authorized. 93 This second group of cases in effect adopts the view
that the release negotiated by the insurer has no effect on the insured's
own claim because the insurer had no actual or apparent authority to
settle that claim.94 Its authority ran only to settlement of the third
party's claim against the insured and, therefore, that claim is the only
one with respect to which the insured is bound. Because a judgment
was not essential to the settlement of the claim, the insured is not
precluded from bringing his own action.
Although insurers apparently have not been characterized as
agents in this second category, the cases are consistent in result and
theory with the cases in the first category. The theory of the first
group of cases was that the settlement required a judgment entered
into by the insurer on behalf of the insured, which gave rise to a bar
against the insured's subsequent action against the claimant. A judgment was required because the third party had brought an action
against the insured that had to be concluded in some manner. Both
the settlement and judgment were within the scope of the insurer's
authorization because both were part of the resolution of the claim
against the insured. In the second group of cases there was no judgment and no bar. The practical effect is that, if settlement requires
entry into a dismissal or judgment, an insured who wishes to protect
his own claim should circumscribe the insurer's authority by forbidding
a conclusive entry of judgment95 or should file his own counterclaim. 96
91. See, e.g., Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 451, 248 S.W.2d 362, 364 (1952).
92. See, e.g., id.; Graves Truck Line v. Home Oil Co., 181 Kan. 507, 312 P.2d
1079 (1957); Berlant v. McAllister, 25 Utah 2d 237, 480 P.2d 126 (1971); Annot.,
32 A.L.R.2d 937 (1952). Contra, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brooks, 218 Ga. 593,
129 S.E.2d 798 (1963) (later overruled by statute; see note 87 supra).
93.

See RESTATE M

T (SEcoND)

OF AcENCY § 100 (1957).

94. See Graves Truck Line v. Home Oil Co., 181 Kan. 507, 510-11, 312 P.2d
1079, 1081-82 (1957); Berlant v. McAllister, 25 Utah 2d 237, 239, 480 P.2d 126, 127
(1971).

95. See generally In re Estate of McClintock, 254 Iowa 593, 118 N.W.2d 540
(1962); Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 925, 244 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 (1951) (fully
describing facts or informing insurer that he has claim may be enough to circumscribe
the insurer's authority).
96. Graves Truck Line v. Home Oil Co., 181 Kan. 507, 510-11, 312 P.2d 1079,
1081 (1957).
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The result in these cases may appear to require a degree of legal
sophistication beyond the capabilities of most laymen, but such a conclusion overlooks important considerations taken into account in this
area. The courts are dealing with the rights of a third party who
believed the dispute to have been finally and conclusively resolved.
The policy of the courts is to encourage such a complete resolution by
barring "compulsory counterclaims" not brought in the original actionY7 Rothtrock9 s illustrates that the insured's proper remedy is
against the insurer for its neglect or bad faith in failing properly to
protect the insured's rights. The insurer's exercise of reasonable care
in resolving the claim should include assertion of the insured's claim
that would serve to bar or reduce the third party's claim against the
insured under principles of contributory or comparative negligence.
As in Rothtrock, a failure to assert the counterclaim should give rise
to an action against the agent insurer. Between the insured and the
third party, however, the insurer acting within its authority concluded
the dispute and the insured is therefore barred from reopening it.
In both groups of cases courts have looked to the authority given
the insurer by the insured under the insurance contract. Within that
authority, the insurer can bind its insured with respect to a third party
in its handling of the third party's claim. Only when the insurer exceeds its authority by, for example, attempting to represent the insured
on his own claim will the insurer's settlement not be binding. In the
event it is binding, as when a judgment is entered, however, the insured
is not without a remedy, as Rothtrock illustrates.
Agency Principles
The characterization of the insurer as the insured's agent is most
often based on the common insurance policy clause that authorizes
the insurer to control the defense and settlement of the claim against
the insured. As the cases reviewed herein demonstrate, this doctrine
has resulted in the assignment of responsibility to the insured for the
acts of his insurer during the course of handling a claim.
Because the courts assess responsibility under an agency theory,
the question arises whether, consistent with general agency principles,
an insurer can appropriately be classified as an agentY9 One authority has defined an agency as "the consensual relationship in which one
party, the principal, appoints a second party, the agent, to act in his
97. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 426.30 (West 1973).
See text accompanying
98. 233 Cal. App. 2d 616, 43 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1965).
notes 88-89 supra.
99. An extensive discussion of the law of agency is beyond the scope of this
Note. A review of basic agency principles, however, will assist in understanding the
theoretical framework within which the courts are operating.
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behalf in a representative capacity, primarily to make contracts between the principal and third party."10 0 Under this definition, the
insurance policy provision upon which courts rely gives rise to an
agency. The policy designates the insurer as the insured's representative for the purpose of resolving his liability upon an asserted claim 10 '
and empowers the insurer to enter contracts. 0 2
The Restatement (Second) of Agency definition, however, appears
to require more in order to effect an agency; the insured or any other
principal must have a modicum of control over the agent-insurer. 0 3
The Restatement is unclear as to the extent of control required. The
argument may be made that, under the practicalities of many insurance
relationships, the insured has too little control over his insurer for it
to be his agent under this definition. 0 4 Nevertheless, as the court
held in Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 05 a contract
may define the relationship of the insured to his insurer as an agency,
notwithstanding the insured's apparent lack of control over his insurer.
Professor Conant has stated that "[a]lthough a principal may retain the right to control the details of the agent's conduct with respect
to matters entrusted to him here is no presumption he will do so."106
Retention of control by the insured would be inconsistent with the
insured's selection of the insurer on the basis of its possessing skills the
insured does not have and in the contract terms by which the insured
vests the insurer with exclusive control to exercise its discretion regarding all acts within its authority.10 7 Thus, despite the insured's
apparent lack of control, he still may be deemed to be the insurer's
principal in the present context. 0 s
Under one analysis, however, there is a measure of control in that
the insured is at liberty at least to inquire about his insurer's behavior.
100.

Conant, supra note 59, at 46.

For other definitions, see CAL. CIr. CODE

§

2295 (West 1954); Selby v. Victoria Mines, Inc., 124 Mont. 321, 327, 221 P.2d 423,
425-26 (1950); RESTATEmmNT (SEcoND) OF AGENcy § 1 (1957).
101. See, e.g., Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 369, 52 N.E.2d 968, 969 (1944).
Under the California definition the insurance contract expressly creates an agency because the insurer "represents" the insured "in dealings with third parties." CAL. Cry.
CODE § 2295 (West 1954).
102. See notes 74-83 & accompanying text supra.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, Comment a (1957).
104. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
105. 81 N.H. 371, 376, 127 A. 708, 711 (1924).
106. Conant, supra note 59, at 46.
107. The insurer, of course, has a fiduciary duty to the insured in exercising its
discretion. See text accompanying notes 12-27 supra. See also RESTATEmEw (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1957).
108. See Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 369, 52 N.E.2d 968, 969 (1944). Under the Restatement view, the insurer might be characterized as an agent-independent
contractor. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AcENCy § 2(3) (1957).
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In fact, an insured's complete failure to inquire has been the basis for
some courts to bind him to his insurer's conduct. 10 9
Independent of the question of the proper characterization of the
insurer-insured relationship, the issue arises whether, consistent with
agency principles of vicarous liability, courts may impute an insurer's
acts to its insured. For the most part, the cases that have been discussed involved responsibility for unfulfilled contracts, 1 10 for negligence,"' or for deceit or misrepresentation." 2 None of the cases involved actions other than those within the course of handling the third
party's claim against the insured. The result of contract cases such
as Selby v. Victoria Mines' 3 and Service Mutual Liability Insurance
Co. v. Aronofskyt 14 is in line with black letter agency law. In both
actions, the insurer was explicitly authorized to negotiate settlements
and, therefore as agent, was able to bind its principal to the settlement
contract."' The same rationale applies to cases in which the negotiated settlement included a term requiring a consent judgment binding upon the insured. 1
The authority of the insurer to dispose of
the claim included the power to have it conclusively dismissed on
behalf of the insured. 7 If the claim had not been settled, the action
would have remained alive; the insured was thereby bound by the
stipulated judgment."l 5
Cases wherein the insurer's negligence has been imputed to the
insured" 9 are consistent with agency principles. Professor Conant
states that generally
[e]ven though the principal has neither reserved the right to
control nor exercised any actual control of the agent's physical
method . . . the principal is still liable for torts of the agent committed in the transactions of the business of the agency. Transaction of business in this context can only mean the dealing of
the agent with third parties in order to enter or to execute contracts within the scope of the agent's authority.12°
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
AGENCY

Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 870, 874 (1963).
See notes 74-83 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 28-44, 70-73 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 53-69 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 75-81 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 82-83 & accompanying text supra.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 144 (1957); W. SEAVEY, LAW OF

§ 55 (1964).

But see id. § 11, at 22 n.86.

116.

See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.

117.

See Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1951);

RESTATEMENT

118.

OF AcENCY § 144 (1957).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 144 (1957).

119.
120.

See notes 28-45, 71-73 & accompanying text supra.
Conant, supra note 59, at 53. Compare id. with Fleming v. E.I. DuPont

(SECOND)

de Nemours & Co., 89 Ga. App. 837, 81 S.E.2d 529 (1954); Conant attempts to
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The "business of the agency"'121 is the settlement or defense of the
third party's claim against the insured. Negligence in processing the
defense 1 22 or drafting the settlement contract 123 is incidental to trans-

acting that business and, therefore, under agency principles is properly
the responsibility of the insured.
The same general rule rendering a principal vicariously liable for
the torts of his agent in the "transaction of the business of the agency'
applies to fraudulent misrepresentations by the agent. 2 4 Cases in
which the insurers have engaged in deceit involve misrepresentations
made during the course of settlement negotiations authorized by the
contracts and the handing over of the claim to the insurer by the insured. 25 Such misrepresentations are therefore properly imputed to
insureds under standard rules of agency.
Extension of the Insured's Responsibility
Under established authority insurers may be liable for certain
wrongs to third parties, such as intentional physical torts, malicious
prosecution, or invasion of privacy.126 In the context of the new era
of greater accountability of insurers for their acts, insurers should be
liable for the damages caused by this kind of "oppressive conduct"
when it is directed towards third parties in the handling of claims. 1 27
clarify what he terms the Restatements "semantic confusion" in the area of servant
and nonservant tort liability. Conant, supra note 59, at 43-44. See also W. SEAVEY,
supra note 115, at 161-62.
121. Conant borrows this language from CAL. Crv. CoDE § 2338 (West 1954).
Conant, supra note 59, at 53 note 49.
122. See text accompanying notes 12-27 supra (default cases).
123. Pacific Indem. Group v. Dunton, 243 Cal. App. 2d 504, 52 Cal. Rptr. 332
(1966). See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
124. See Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 369, 52 N.E.2d 968, 969 (1944). Insurers are reasonably expected to make many and various representations in handling
a claim. See Gilmore v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 1344, 1348 (10th Cir.
1974); Allen v. Carlotti, 400 F. Supp. 1037, 1042 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Soft Water Util.,
Inc. v. LeFevre, 308 N.E.2d 395, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
125. E.g., Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 52 N.E.2d 968 (1944); Will v. Jessen,
273 Wis. 495, 78 N.W.2d 905 (1956).
126. Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr.
860 (1976) (invasion of privacy); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 739 (1971).
127. Levin & Chapman, supra note 3. The authors suggest that "the essence of
a cause of action against an insurance carrier for oppressive conduct lies in the failure
to deal fairly ......
Id. at 376. They also state that "[ain unfairly low settlement
might be accomplished by the insurance carrier, despite the legitimacy of the claim,
and its indefensibility from a liability standpoint, by the use of unfair and oppressive
tactics. Such tactics are familiar: deny liability (despite the clear liability and lack
of good faith defense) and inject 'plausible,' although unsound, defenses which are
asserted 'tongue in cheek,' all to the end of delaying the litigation so as to induce
the claimant to settle for an unfair amount." Id. at 389 (italics in original). See
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The question to be addressed is what responsibility for such conduct
could or should be assessed to insureds as principals. 125
If the insured is the principal of the insurer, the issue arises
whether the insured should be liable to a third party for the malicious,
wanton, or wilful misconduct of the agent-insurer in the course of
settling or defending against the third party's claim. The answer necessarily turns upon application of general agency principles and the
policy underlying those principles.
Professor Conant has suggested that the principal's lack of control
is a common characteristic of agency relationships 12 ' and that "the key
issues of agency law center on the discretion vested in agents and their
misuse of it."130 Some courts, nonetheless, refuse to impute liability
for agents' torts if principals do not retain the right to control the
agent.1 3 ' Other courts require more, that the principals occupy the
position of "masters ,"'132 that is, employers who direct or control their
employees' activities. The crucial factor in these cases is that the
1 33
right to control existed, not necessarily that the control was exercised.
No court has considered the issue of whether an insured has the
right to control his insurer's conduct of negotiations or defense. Arguably he does not, because the insurance contract often permits the
insurer to make any settlement "it deems expedient."' 134 In the case
of a large corporate insured, however, a right of control may more
readily be found, particularly if the insured maintains its own legal
Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (relied upon
heavily by Levin & Chapman). Cf. Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150
So. 2d 154 (1963) (imposing liability for collection tactics that constitute outrageous
conduct). See generally Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REv. 40 (1956);
note 6 supra.
128. See Levin & Chapman, supra note 3, at 388, suggesting that the insured may
have a nondelagable duty to compensate the injured third party if liability is reasonably clear and that oppressive conduct committed in performance of that duty may
give rise to liability of the insured. Such an assignment of liability is consistent
with agency principles. See Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 468, 93 N.W.2d 455,
458 (1958), disapproved on other grounds, Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51
Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.E.2d 349 (1971).
129. See text accompanying note 106 supra and note 136 infra.
130. Conant, supra note 59, at 47.
131. See Dumas v. Lloyd, 6 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 286 N.E.2d 566 (1972); Sullivan
v. Josephine County, 18 Or. App. 432, 436, 525 P.2d 1071-73 (1974); Graham v.
McCord, 384 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1964); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1957).
132. See, e.g., Brinkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1283, 1287
(10th Cir. 1973); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 289 So. 2d 178, 186 (La. Ct.
App. 1973). See also Conant, supra note 59, at 44-48.
133. Conant, supra note 59, at 44.
134. See note 8 supra.
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staff.'1 5 The staff would have the ability, knowledge, and resources
to oversee the insurer's actions. Furthermore, such a large customer
would have the economic ability to alter its insurer's course of conduct.
Other insureds, however, may lack control over their insurers'
handling of their defenses' 3' and may not be readily classified as their
insurers' masters.'1 7 The result in states following the "control" approach could be that liability for insurers' wilful torts is not imputable
to smaller insureds, absent proof that a particular insured directed or

authorized the methods used by the insurer' 38 or had the right to
control the insurer. 3 9
In noninsurance cases, many courts have disregarded the right-

to-control test and have held a principal liable for the intentional misconduct of an agent done in the furtherance of the objects of the

agency.-40 Principals have been held liable when nonservant agents

have committed battery,14 1 fraud, 14 2 defamation,143 or malicious prosecution.'144 At least one court has explicitly recognized a dichotomy
between master-servant and principal-agent vicarious liability. It
held that, apart from master-servant liability, a principal may be held
liable if "the agent, while acting within the scope of the agency, com-

mits a tort
135.
136.

.

.

45

Among the types of nonservant agents to whom

See, e.g., Stevens v. Gulf Oil Corp., 108 R.I. 209, 274 A.2d 163 (1971).
See H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 73-74 (1970).
137. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957) (definition of servant).
138. See id. § 250. See also Clark v. Andrews, 109 Cal. App. 2d 193, 199, 240
P.2d 330, 334 (1952).
139. See note 131 supra.
140. Conant, supra note 59, at 53-55.
141. Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269
(1973) (private detective); Sayers v. Boyles, 280 Ala. 153, 190 So. 2d 707 (1966)
(real estate broker). Sayers was apparently misread in Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
508 F.2d 167, 173 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975), which characterized Boyles' agent as his "employee."
142. Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 323 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
affd, 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972); Soft Water Util., Inc. v. LeFevre, 308 N.E.2d
395 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); John Deere Co. v. Nygard Equip., Inc., 225 N.W.2d 80
(N.D. Sup. Ct. 1974).
143. De Ronde v. Gaytime Shops, 239 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956); Smith-Johnson
Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670, 675 (E.D. Va. 1975) (dictum); Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Owens, 207 S.W. 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
144. Chamberlin Co. of America v. Mays, 96 Ga. App. 755, 101 S.E.2d 728 (1957).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AcENCY § 253, Comment a (1957).
145. De Ronde v. Gaytime Shops, 239 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1956) (defamation
action). Accord, Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Owens, 207 S.W. 666, 671
(Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (holding test of principal's liability is "not whether the agent
was authorized to do the particular thing which constituted the wrong complained of
or caused the injury for which recovery is sought, or whether it was done in violation
of the principal's orders, but whether it was done while he was engaged in his principal's business and within the apparent scope of his authority").

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

these principles have been applied are attorneys, 146 architects, 147 real
estate brokers,148 stock brokerage houses, 149 private investigators,' 50
and collection agencies. 151 Each of these persons or entities, found
to be a nonservant agent, had been enlisted because it possessed special
skills that the principal desired it to use in prosecuting the purpose of
the agency. Of note is the fact that each agency is characterized by
the principal's lack of control over his agent.
In the insurance context, by virtue of the insurance contract, the
insured appoints a skilled and experienced entity, an insurer, to represent him in the handling of a third party's claim against him. The
relationship may also be characterized by lack of control, especially
with small insureds. In its representation of the insured, an insurer
resembles the type of agent to whom these principles of vicarious liability have been applied. The rationale for imputing liability to this
type of agent has been variously explained, but one court emphasized
the public policy in "promot[ing] safety for third persons. The theory
of liability is that the principal is holding out the agent as competent
and fit to be trusted, and thereby, in effect, warranting good conduct
1 52
and fidelity of the agent."
From the third party claimant's point of view, the assignment of
responsibility serves two purposes. First, it encourages principals to
police the conduct of the agent. Second, in the event of misconduct,
it reduces the risk that the burden of that misconduct will fall upon
the victim by making the party for whose benefit the agent acts
responsible.
In the insurance context, the potential for liability would serve a
third beneficial purpose. Insurers who expose their insureds to liability by improperly handling third party claims become vulnerable
146. E.g., Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Owens, 207 S.W. 666 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918).
147. E.g., E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Const. Co., 387 F. Supp. 1001, 1033 (S.D.
Ala. 1974).
148. E.g., Sayers v. Boyles, 280 Ala. 153, 190 So. 2d 707 (1966).
149. E.g., Soft Water Util., Inc. v. LeFevre, 308 N.E.2d 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974);
Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 323 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd,
464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972).
150. E.g., Noble v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr.
269 (1973).
151. E.g., Chamberlin Co. of America v. Mays, 96 Ga. App. 755, 101 S.E.2d 728
(1957). In Noble v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269
(1975), the court held that the hirer of a private detective would be liable as a
principal for an intentional invasion of the plaintiff's privacy, if the proof established
that the intentional tort was committed within the scope of the agency.
152. Id. (citation omitted). See also Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz. App. 277, 280,
501 P.2d 453, 456 (1972); Gilmore v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 1344, 1348
(10th Cir. 1974).
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to actions by insureds for bad faith. Such actions could even be a
basis for recovery of punitive damages from insurers.153 To avoid this
liability, insurers would be encouraged to police their own conduct.
This self-regulation may be more effective in correcting abuses than
insureds' attempts to control insurers.
If an insurer acts wrongly within the scope of its agency, the insured should no more escape liability than the principal who retains
an attorney or an investigator. In each case, the principal has turned
the agent 'loose upon the public" and cannot be permitted to sit back
aid benefit while disclaiming all responsibility.15 4 A legal basis exists
upon which to impute to insureds the intentional misconduct of insurers during the course of representing their insureds. If the insurer
commits acts of the nature mentioned above' 5 that are within "the
scope of the agency," liability could be imposed. 5 6
The remaining question is whether a court should impose liability.
The answer requires consideration of the social policies included in
the assignment of responsibility to insureds.
The major reason for assigning responsibility to the insured as
principal lies in an economic rationale similar to that underlying an
argument for extension of liability for outrageous or oppressive conduct
to third party situations. Such an extension would serve to
deter [insurers] from future similar misconduct . . . pay the
claimant who has been wronged; [and] result eventually in increased business and profits for those companies who do act
fairly, because customers (insureds) will seek out those insurance
carriers whose claims personnel and counsel recognize that the
best interests of their assureds is not served by unfair and oppressive dealing with legitimate claimants, or by litigiously protracting
litigation.157

These interests would also be promoted by the imposition of liability on the insureds. If insureds were held responsible for insurers'
tactics, they would consider insurers' reputations when shopping for
153. See Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 942, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 427,
553 P.2d 584, 587 (1976).
154. Gilmore v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 1344, 1348 (10th Cir. 1974).
155. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
156. See Planters Cotton Oil Co. v. Baker, 181 Ga. 161, 181 S.E. 671 (1935).
If the insurer is conducting settlement negotiations or defending an action, then it
seemingly would be difficult to argue that those acts were not within the scope of
the agency so long as they were directed at reduced liability for the insured. Cf. id.
at 164-65, 181 S.E. at 673 (Russell, C. J., dissenting) (it does not matter that agent
acts for its own benefit as well).
157. Levin & Chapman, supra note 3, at 376 (italics in original); cf. Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments in the Law of
Tort and Contract, 48 NoTRE DAME LAW. 1303, 1312 (1972-73) (deterrence rationale of Fletcher and Eckenrode).
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insurance and, as policy holders, would oversee more closely the insurers' activities on their behalf. 15 8 The demand for the services of
insurers who act fairly should increase, and during the term of the
policy insureds will serve as a check on insurers to ensure that they
maintain a fair approach in handling claims of injured third parties.
If the insured is a large corporation, it would have greater ability
and resources to control its insurer, and in third party situations, it
could exert more influence upon its insurers to deal fairly. Imposition
of responsibility on other insureds, however, would also advance these
interests.
In the absence of any responsibility, an insured need not consider
the claims-handling record or reputation of the insurer selected. Once
a claim is referred to the insurer, the insured may passively ignore
how the insurer resolves it. The insured may maintain this attitude
despite the fact that he is the one who originally selected the insurer,
injured the claimant, and passed the claim onto the insurer. Perhaps
most importantly, the insured may ignore the insurer's conduct even
though he or she stands to gain, to the extent the claim is not covered
by the policy, by any lower settlement or by a judgment obtained by
the insurer.
By making the insured responsible regardless of economic status
or ability to control the insurer, inequities may be remedied, and fairer
treatment accorded claimants. All insureds would be encouraged to
select insurers more carefully to ensure that they are covered by "good"
companies. The stimulus to be a "good" company would then economically weigh against the advantages of lower settlements or judgments derived from unfair tactics. In addition, the insured would be
encouraged to inquire into the insurer's handling of a claim. Although
the insurance contract may not enable the insured to demand control
of the handling of the claim, under the contract the insurer would have
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the insured25 9 The
implied duty would obligate the insurer to avoid misconduct and would
give the insured some leverage over the insurer, despite the insurance
policy's language. More importantly, this duty would encourage selfregulation on the part of insurers.
The result of imposing responsibility upon even small insureds
158. In Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz. App. 277, 280, 501 P.2d 453, 456 (1972),
the court explains the rationale underlying the vicarious liability of an employer:
"It is elementary that everyone in the management of his affairs shall so conduct them
as not to cause an injury to another, and if he undertakes to manage his affairs through
others, he is bound to so manage them that third persons are not injured by any
breach of legal duty on the part of such others while they are engaged upon his business and within the scope of their authority."
159. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16, 426
P.2d 173, 176 (1967).
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is not unfair or harsh. The third party claimant, confronted by the
defendant's insurer, is at least an equally innocent third party who
has been thrust into an unpleasant situation by no choice of her or
his own. As between two innocent parties, the one triggering the
injury should bear the burden of the injury. 160 Whether the insured
is an "innocent" party should be questioned. The insured is no more
innocent or devoid of fault than any other principal who may benefit
from the agent's acts and upon whom liability descends. On balance,
between the insured and the third party claimant, responsibility for
the conduct of the insurer by which the insured stands to gain should
lie with the insured.
One concern of judges or legislators may be for the insured
who is a small economic unit. Such insureds may lack resources or
knowledge to determine which insurers are "good" in handling claims.
Relevant information could be made available by state regulatory
agencies' reviewing of complaints and publishing statistics on valid
charges brought against insurers. The California Department of Insurance, for example, publishes a monthly report, which lists all public
actions taken by the department against insurers or brokers. 16' If this
information, which is already public, were made available generally,
prospective insureds could inform themselves about reputable insurers.
Imposition of responsibility upon insureds for misconduct of their
insurers not only would serve to deter misconduct by insurers but

would also serve two additional important functions. First, an injured party could be compensated if an insurer is insolvent but the
insured is relatively affluent. Insurers have occasionally folded, although statistics as to exact numbers are difficult to obtain. 62 On a
rare occasion an insurer has committed misconduct in handling a
liability policy and contemporaneously has become insolvent.'0 3
The second function to be served is the assignment of responsibility to the insured which would permit the third party to consolidate
into one action all of the claims deriving from one series of transactions.
The third party and the courts could avoid the multiplicity of actions

necessitated if the claimant must sue the insured on the original cause
of action and the insurer separately on the causes of action flowing
from the handling of the original claim.
The objection has been made that the result of imputing the in160. Compare W. PRossE, LAW OF TORTS, 278-81 (4th ed. 1971) (rationale underlying respondeat superior) with id. at 459 (recovery for injuries set off by one tort
but directly caused by another).
161. CAL. INS. Cosm'n, Monthly Report.
162. D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INsuRERs, Ch. 1 (U.S. Dept.
of Transp. 1970).
163. Holmes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. 290, 14 P.2d 149 (1932).
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surer's misconduct to the insured is basically unfair because the insured
often has no means to control the insurer and, in many cases, fewer
resources than the insurer. One reason for imposing liability, however,
is to encourage control. The insurer's duty of good faith to the insured
would encompass acting fairly toward third parties and would enable
the insured to hold the insurer responsible for any failure to do so.
Further, the insured, as the vicariously liable principal, has a right of
action against the insurer to compensate him for whatever damages
64
he may have to pay.1
To hold the insured responsible is not in every case to make him
liable. A third party may elect to assert liability alternatively or
jointly against agent and principal. In those cases in which the insurer is more "collectable" than the insured, as a practical matter the
third party will more likely pursue the insurer. In those cases in
which the insurer is not solvent or the insured is both available and
collectable, however, the third party will have a remedy.
Conclusion
This Note has undertaken a review of the responsibility of an insured for acts of his or her insurer in handling a third party's claim
against the insured. Many courts view the insurer as the agent of
the insured for purposes of claim settlement. As a result, responsibility for insurers' actions has been assigned to insureds under normal
agency principles.
In view of the present trend of increased scrutiny of insurers' conduct, this assignment could have important ramifications for insureds.
The insurer's oppressive or other intentional misconduct toward third
party claimants may become imputable to the insured. Such an assessment of liability will fulfill the usual policy reasons underlying a
principal's vicarious liability. More importantly, the ultimate result
of imputing responsibility to the insured will be to bring pressure upon
insurers who use unfair settlement tactics. In the end, the protection
insureds are beginning to receive should be extended to third party
claimants; they should be able to expect fair and reasonable treatment
from opposing insurers who are employed because they give such
treatment.
Stephen J. Kottmeier*
164. Pacific Indem. Group v. Dunton, 243 Cal. App. 2d 504, 509, 52 Cal. Rptr.
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